Minimum Virtual Contacts: A Framework for Specific Jurisdiction in Cyberspace by Kleven, Adam R.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 116 Issue 5 
2018 
Minimum Virtual Contacts: A Framework for Specific Jurisdiction 
in Cyberspace 
Adam R. Kleven 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Internet Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, Jurisprudence Commons, and the Torts 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Adam R. Kleven, Minimum Virtual Contacts: A Framework for Specific Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 116 
MICH. L. REV. 785 (2018). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol116/iss5/4 
 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
NOTE
Minimum Virtual Contacts: A Framework for
Specific Jurisdiction in Cyberspace
Adam R. Kleven*
As the ubiquity and importance of the internet continue to grow, courts will
address more cases involving online activity. In doing so, courts will confront
the threshold issue of whether a defendant can be subject to specific personal
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court, however, has yet to speak to this internet-
jurisdiction issue. Current precedent, when strictly applied to the internet,
yields fundamentally unfair results when addressing specific jurisdiction. To
better achieve the fairness aim of due process, this must change. This Note
argues that, in internet tort cases, the “express aiming” requirement should be
discarded from the jurisdictional analysis and that courts should instead con-
sider a defendant’s technological sophistication and the frequency with which
a defendant engages in tortious conduct. These factors should guide courts’
determinations about whether a defendant has established “minimum virtual
contacts” with a forum state. Additionally, courts should simplify the reasona-
bleness factors articulated in cases like Burger King and apply this simplified
reasonableness test seriously. This minimum virtual contacts standard is more
flexible and therefore better suited to adapt to the changing technological
landscape, analyze close cases, and achieve fair outcomes.
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Introduction
The ubiquity and importance of the internet continue to grow. In a
recent case about the FCC’s statutory classification of the internet,1 Judges
Tatel and Srinivasan described the importance of internet content and ser-
vices (e.g., Gmail, Facebook, Venmo) in society: “Over the past two decades,
this content has transformed nearly every aspect of our lives, from profound
actions like choosing a leader, building a career, and falling in love to more
quotidian ones like hailing a cab and watching a movie.”2 The percentage of
Americans who have internet access increased from 52% in 2000 to 84% in
2015.3 The upshot is that the question of what legal framework should be
placed upon the internet is an important one, and society recognizes that the
stakes are high.
1. The FCC received 3.7 million comments during the comment period for this
rulemaking—significantly more than is typical. This “Net Neutrality” issue also generated in-
terest in popular culture. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 695 (D.C. Cir. 2016);
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 80 Fed. Reg. 19,738, 19,746 (Apr. 13, 2015) (to
be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 2); LastWeekTonight, Net Neutrality: Last Week Tonight with John
Oliver (HBO), YouTube (June 1, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fpbOEoRrHyU
[https://perma.cc/3KCA-MKBW] (discussing the “Net Neutrality” issue and imploring people
to file comments with the FCC).
2. U.S. Telecom Ass’n, 825 F.3d at 698.
3. Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000–2015, Pew Res.
Ctr. (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-internet-access-
2000-2015/ [https://perma.cc/S3SU-5965].
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Meanwhile, the legal system struggles to keep pace with rapidly evolving
technology. The law of jurisdiction is not immune to this struggle. The Su-
preme Court, which has heard several cases concerning personal jurisdiction
in recent years,4 has noted how the nature of online activity presents differ-
ent questions for a jurisdictional analysis.5 As a preliminary matter, this
Note focuses on specific personal jurisdiction—also known as long-arm ju-
risdiction—rather than general jurisdiction. Specific jurisdiction involves a
plaintiff bringing an out-of-state defendant into court in a given state (i.e.,
the “forum state”), typically the plaintiff’s home state, for a cause of action
arising out of an activity or an occurrence in the forum state.6 Under general
jurisdiction, a defendant can be sued for any cause of action in the state in
which the defendant is “at home”7—thus, defendants can always be sued in
their home states.
The internet has blurred territorial lines.8 Originally, the jurisdictional
question was answered by the territorial power of a sovereign state, which
was deemed to have jurisdiction over all persons and things within its geo-
graphic boundary.9 But changes in commerce and technology have chal-
lenged prior conceptions of territory and accompanying jurisdictional
rules.10 More recent changes raise a new jurisdictional question: When a user
engages in activity online, where is that activity occurring? Explaining some
of the logistics behind online activity will show that cyberspace is not as
territorially amorphous as it may appear. Here the term “logistics” is used to
reference the physical processes initiated when, for example, a user visits a
website or sends an email and, in part, the infrastructure behind those activ-
ities. This claim that territory is not wholly irrelevant to questions of juris-
diction related to online activity is not meant to return jurisdiction back to
4. See, e.g., Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017); Walden
v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014); Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915 (2011); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
5. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1125 n.9 (“[T]his case does not present the very different
questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct translate into ‘con-
tacts’ with a particular State. . . . We leave questions about virtual contacts for another day.”);
see also Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[W]hat do [strict
rules that limit jurisdiction] mean when a company targets the world by selling products from
its Web site? . . . Those issues have serious commercial consequences but are totally absent in
this case.”).
6. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751 (citing Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919).
7. Id.
8. This fact is illustrated by things as simple as the differences between sending letters
and sending emails, see infra Section II.A, or between Black Friday in-store shopping (shoppers
are constrained to visit the stores geographically close to them) and Cyber Monday online
shopping (shoppers can purchase items from any store that has a website).
9. Patricia L. Bellia et al., Cyberlaw: Problems of Policy and Jurisprudence in
the Information Age 129 (4th ed. 2011).
10. Id.
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the old Pennoyer-type analysis.11 Rather, it is meant to show that, in some
respect, “contact” is made with a forum state via a defendant’s online
activities.
Scholars and commentators have argued for a variety of solutions to the
internet-jurisdiction conundrum.12 Some advocate for dispelling the “fic-
tion” that online activity creates any meaningful contact with a forum, and
they are content with the plaintiff-restrictive results that flow from such a
view.13 Others, perhaps implicitly questioning judges’ competency on this
issue, advocate for legislative solutions.14 But an alternative path has yet to be
seriously explored.
This Note argues that courts should abandon a strict application of the
“express aiming” requirement and adopt a two-pronged “minimum virtual
contacts” standard to determine “how a defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and
conduct translate into ‘contacts’ with a particular State.”15 Courts should
subject a defendant to specific jurisdiction when (1) the defendant engages
in sophisticated or continuous virtual conduct that causes harm to the
plaintiff in the forum and (2) when exercising jurisdiction over the defen-
dant is reasonable—and the reasonableness test should be simplified and
applied seriously. Part I provides an overview of the basic framework of the
minimum contacts standard, the effects test, and the Seventh Circuit’s recent
decision in Advanced Tactical v. Real Action Paintball, which addressed estab-
lishing specific jurisdiction via online activity. Part II argues that Advanced
11. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (requiring as a prerequisite for a court to
exercise specific jurisdiction that the defendant be physically present in the forum state).
12. See, e.g., Damon C. Andrews & John M. Newman, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law in the Cloud, 73 Md. L. Rev. 313, 364–71 (2013) (arguing that defendants should “take
[their] plaintiff where [they] find him,” establishing the Cloud as its own jurisdiction, and for
legislative reform); Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, Personal Jurisdiction and the
“Interwebs”, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 1129, 1167 (2015) (arguing that online activity essentially
never creates physical contact with a forum and, therefore, “[i]nternet-based contacts should
rarely, if ever, suffice for personal jurisdiction”); Jenny L. Grantz, Note, A Culture Without
Consequences? Redefining Purposeful Availment for Wrongful Online Conduct, 63 Hastings L.J.
1135, 1166 (2012) (arguing defendants need not necessarily know where their plaintiff is lo-
cated and that online conduct may sometimes lead to jurisdiction in multiple forums); Wil-
liam Schildknecht, Note, Justice for J-Law? Specific Personal Jurisdiction over Internet Torts in
the Wake of Walden v. Fiore, 56 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 24–31 (2016) (noting the pros and
cons of the various approaches outlined by Andrews and Newman, but concluding that in-
ternet tort plaintiffs’ best litigation strategy would be utilizing the effects test); cf. Stephen E.
Sachs, How Congress Should Fix Personal Jurisdiction, 108 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1301, 1301 (2014)
(arguing that questions of personal jurisdiction should involve asking who may hear a case as
opposed to where a case may be heard).
13. See, e.g., Trammell & Bambauer, supra note 12, at 1167.
14. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 12, at 368–71; Trammel & Bambauer, supra note
12, at 1172–73; cf. Alex Lipton, Supreme Court Justices Just Don’t Understand Tech, Shake
(June 25, 2014), http://www.shakelaw.com/blog/supreme-court-judges-tech/ [https://
perma.cc/J4P9-VUJZ] (noting Supreme Court justices’ lack of knowledge with technology in
general); Sachs, supra note 12, at 1302 (arguing for a legislative solution to the current
problems with personal jurisdiction generally).
15. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014).
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Tactical demonstrates the need for a modified minimum virtual contacts
model that accounts for the nuances presented by changing technology.
Courts should recognize that, while notions of territory are blurred on the
internet, some virtual contact is established between forums through online
transactions. Part III then presents the above-mentioned two-pronged ap-
proach as a solution.
I. The Basic Principles of Minimum Contacts, the Confusion of
Calder’s Effects Test, and the Undue Restriction on
Internet Jurisdiction
This Part addresses the Supreme Court’s minimum contacts16 frame-
work and how lower courts assess whether a defendant’s online activity
brings her within the reach of a state’s long-arm jurisdiction. Section I.A
outlines the basic framework of the minimum contacts analysis. Section I.B
discusses the Calder effects test, which courts have widely applied to online
activity, and the Court’s recent decision in Walden v. Fiore. Section I.C ana-
lyzes Advanced Tactical, which applied Walden to online activity.
A state’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant must
comport with due process of law, but what satisfies due process fluctuates
depending on the case. Since International Shoe, the fact-specific minimum
contacts analysis has set the constitutionally permissible outer limits of a
state’s exercise of specific jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.17 Still, mini-
mum contacts itself is a general analytic proposition and its application has
fluctuated over time.
A. The Basic Framework of the Minimum Contacts Analysis Can Be
Adapted to Internet-Jurisdiction Cases
To subject a defendant to specific jurisdiction, due process requires that,
if she is not physically present in the forum state, she must have “certain
minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit
does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ”18
Even if a defendant has certain contacts with a forum, a court must ask
whether such contacts are jurisdictionally relevant: Are the contacts of the
right type? The connection with the forum must arise out of contacts the
16. “Minimum contacts” is simply the level of contact needed for a state to exercise
specific jurisdiction over a defendant consistent with due process. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). What precisely satisfies this standard, however, is often un-
clear and depends on the case.
17. See Bellia et al., supra note 9, at 130–31.
18. Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
“Traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” is a phrase of art made popular by the
International Shoe case. It is a general concept baked into the due process requirement for
personal jurisdiction—that is, the maintenance of the suit against the defendant cannot “of-
fend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” Id. This Note sometimes omits
the word “substantial.”
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defendant herself creates with the forum state;19 a plaintiff’s connections
with the forum cannot be a decisive factor in the due process inquiry.20
Moreover, “[the] unilateral activity of another party or a third person is not
an appropriate consideration when determining whether a defendant has
sufficient contacts with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdic-
tion.”21 Finally, courts assess the relationship between the defendant, the fo-
rum, and the litigation—that is, the defendant’s suit-related connections
with the forum—to determine whether a state can exercise specific jurisdic-
tion over a foreign defendant.22 A defendant’s contacts with the forum state
must comport with these principles for a state to exercise specific jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.
A court must also consider whether these contacts, even if they are of
the right type, are sufficient to breach the “minimum” threshold. Several
cases address transactions and when commercial activity might breach this
threshold.23 These cases can be instructive in the tort context. For instance, J.
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro addressed whether a New Jersey court
could exercise jurisdiction over an English manufacturer based on the fact
that the manufacturer targeted the U.S. market and at least one product
made its way into New Jersey.24 Justice Kennedy’s plurality held that jurisdic-
tion over the defendant was not established by this single contact because
the defendant’s conduct was not purposefully directed at New Jersey in par-
ticular.25 Justice Breyer’s concurrence pointed to precedent, stating that
“[n]one of [the Court’s] precedents finds that a single isolated sale, even if
19. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985).
20. See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 332 (1980).
21. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).
22. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977). Shaffer further stressed that this rela-
tionship, rather than the sovereignty of the forum state, is the central concern of the due
process inquiry. Id.
23. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plural-
ity opinion) (holding that the substantial connection with the forum must be brought about
by the defendant purposefully directing action toward the forum); id. at 117 (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that jurisdiction may be permis-
sible where there is a “regular and anticipated flow of products” into the forum); id. at 122
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (arguing that “a regular
course of dealing that results in deliveries of over 100,000 units annually over a period of
several years would constitute ‘purposeful availment’ even though the item delivered to the
forum State was a standard product marketed throughout the world”); Burger King, 471 U.S.
at 479–80 (holding that single contract, which contemplates a long-term business relationship
between two parties, can establish a substantial connection with the forum such that jurisdic-
tion is permissible); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 286–87 (1980)
(a single sale to customer who takes an accident-causing product into the forum state is insuf-
ficient to establish jurisdiction); see also Boschetto v. Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir.
2008) (holding that a single transaction via eBay, without evidence that the defendant engaged
in regular sales over eBay, is insufficient to establish jurisdiction).
24. 564 U.S. 873 (2011).
25. But the defendant’s conduct was purposefully directed at the U.S. market generally.
See Nicastro, 564 U.S. at 886 (plurality opinion).
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accompanied by the kind of sales effort indicated here, is sufficient” to es-
tablish jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.26 A single act, however, can
support jurisdiction so long as it creates a substantial connection with the
forum.27 In short, under the minimum contacts framework, certain activity
requires more than a single contact with and purposeful direction toward
the forum to establish jurisdiction. But a single contact that creates a “sub-
stantial,” potentially long-term, or repeated connection with a forum can
also be sufficient to establish jurisdiction.
Lastly, even if a defendant has minimum contacts with a forum state,
the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant must also be reasonable. The
Court in Burger King and World-Wide Volkswagen articulated a reasonable-
ness standard that considers five factors:
[C]ourts in “appropriate case[s]” may evaluate “the burden on the defen-
dant,” “the forum State’s interest in adjudicating the dispute,” “the plain-
tiff’s interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief,” “the interstate
judicial system’s interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of con-
troversies,” and the “shared interest of the several States in furthering fun-
damental substantive social policies.”28
The Court has applied this reasonableness prong of the jurisdictional in-
quiry sparingly.29 Section III.B argues for a simplification and more serious
application of the reasonableness test.
B. The Confusion of the Calder Effects Test, Walden’s Clarification, and
the Open Question of Internet Jurisdiction
In intentional tort cases, lower courts also frequently employ the Calder
effects test.30 Calder v. Jones involved Florida defendants who wrote and ed-
ited an allegedly libelous story for the National Enquirer about the plaintiff,
Shirley Jones, a California resident.31 The Court held that jurisdiction was
“proper in California based on the ‘effects’ of [defendants’] Florida conduct
26. Id. at 888 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
27. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475 n.18 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220,
223 (1957)). Burger King involved a single contract between a Michigan defendant and a Flor-
ida plaintiff, but the contract contemplated a long-term business relationship. Id. at 479–80.
McGee involved an insurance contract between a Texas defendant and a California plaintiff,
and the Court also saw this contract as creating a “substantial connection” between the defen-
dant and the forum. McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223–24 (1957); cf. Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (concluding that a single magazine article could serve as the basis
for jurisdiction for a libel suit).
28. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 477 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 292).
29. See infra Part III.
30. See Julie Cromer Young, The Online-Contacts Gamble After Walden v. Fiore, 19 Lewis
& Clark L. Rev. 753, 757–61 (2015) (summarizing courts’ applications of Calder to online
activity). But Walden also framed the Calder effects test narrowly and within the confines of
the minimum contacts standard. See John T. Parry, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction after
Bauman and Walden, 19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 607, 621–23 (2015).
31. 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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in California.”32 And contrary to defendants’ assertions, the Court stated
that the defendants’ intentional “actions were expressly aimed at Califor-
nia.”33 Whether the “express aiming” statement was holding or dicta is de-
batable.34 Regardless, as will be discussed, Walden’s subsequent reading of
Calder confirms that effects alone, without more, cannot provide the basis
for jurisdiction.35
Following Calder, most courts set out a three-part effects test that in-
cluded an express-aiming requirement. Generally, this test requires that a
defendant (1) commit an intentional tort (2) expressly aimed at the forum
(such that the forum can be considered the focal point of the tortious activ-
ity), (3) causing harm that the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the
forum state.36 The express-aiming requirement is satisfied “when the defen-
dant is alleged to have engaged in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff
whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum state.”37 Tamburo
v. Dworkin exemplifies this principle in the online context.38 There, the Sev-
enth Circuit held that foreign defendants expressly aimed their conduct at
Illinois by utilizing their websites and sending email blasts to generate a
consumer boycott specifically against the plaintiff, whom the defendants
knew lived and operated his business in Illinois.39 Conversely, other courts,
even on similar facts, reached opposite results.40 For example, in Shrader v.
Biddinger, a defendant sent an allegedly defamatory email and posted, on a
website, a defamatory message specifically targeted at the plaintiff, who the
32. Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. The Court also noted that California was where the brunt of
the harm was suffered and was the state in which the Enquirer had its largest circulation. Id. at
788–90.
33. Id. at 789; cf. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) (plurality
opinion) (stating a “purposefully directed” requirement); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (plurality opinion) (same).
34. Compare, e.g., IMO Indus. v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 265–66 (3d Cir. 1998) (re-
quiring express aiming), with Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997)
(“[T]he state in which the victim of a tort suffers the injury may entertain a suit against the
accused tortfeasor.”), abrogated by Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action
Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2014).
35. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014); see also Advanced Tactical Ord-
nance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 802 (7th Cir. 2014).
36. See, e.g., Picot v. Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1213–14 (9th Cir. 2015); IMO Indus., 155
F.3d at 265–66.
37. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat’l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000).
But Walden shows even those conditions, though perhaps necessary, are insufficient—rather,
the defendant’s conduct must be related to the forum beyond the fact that the plaintiff was
located in the forum. See Picot, 780 F.3d at 1215.
38. 601 F.3d 693, 697–98 (7th Cir. 2010); see also Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141
F.3d 1316, 1321 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that California’s exercise of jurisdiction was permissi-
ble where defendant registered the Panavision’s trademarks as domain names for the purpose
of extorting money from Panavision, whom the defendant knew to be located in California).
39. Tamburo, 601 F.3d at 697.
40. See, e.g., Griffis v. Luban, 646 N.W.2d 527 (Minn. 2002); see also Shrader v. Bid-
dinger, 633 F.3d 1235, 1245–46 (10th Cir. 2011) (requiring more than the defendant targeting
a known forum resident).
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defendant knew lived and worked in Oklahoma.41 The Tenth Circuit rea-
soned that Oklahoma was not “the focal point” of the defendant’s online
conduct and held that Oklahoma did not have jurisdiction over the
defendant.42
Then in Walden v. Fiore, the Supreme Court clarified that the minimum
contacts principles apply to intentional tort cases as well43—seemingly les-
sening Calder’s relevance. Walden addressed a Bivens action by Nevada
plaintiffs against a Georgia defendant. The defendant was a Drug Enforce-
ment Administration agent who, at an Atlanta airport, seized $97,000 be-
longing to the plaintiffs based partly upon a probable cause affidavit that
contained knowingly false statements.44 Although the defendant knew that
the plaintiffs resided in a particular forum, the Court held that Nevada
could not exercise specific jurisdiction because such contacts arose solely out
of the plaintiffs’ contacts with the forum.45 Importantly, “the defendant had
no other contacts with Nevada” itself.46 Although the defendant formed
contacts with the forum insofar as he made contact with the plaintiffs who
resided there, the defendant “formed no jurisdictionally relevant contacts
with Nevada.”47
Walden’s significance arises from the fact that it reined in broad applica-
tions of Calder,48 which lower courts had employed in cases concerning on-
line contacts. Essentially, the Court found the defendant’s contacts with the
forum too random and fortuitous and narrowed the effects test’s applica-
tion.49 But the Walden framework applied strictly to the internet could result
in a rather significant restriction on the reach of states’ long-arm jurisdic-
tion. Recognizing this argument, the Court added a footnote but punted on
the issue “for another day.”50
In sum, application of the effects test produced rather inconsistent re-
sults, even though most courts adopted some form of the express-aiming
41. Shrader, 633 F.3d at 1237–38.
42. See id. at 1245.
43. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014).
44. Id. at 1119–20.
45. Id. at 1124–25.
46. Id. at 1119.
47. Id. at 1124.
48. See, e.g., ClearOne, Inc. v. Revolabs, Inc., 369 P.3d 1269, 1278 (Utah 2016) (“[T]o the
extent that [the court’s previous decision] adopted an interpretation of Calder that permitted a
plaintiff to be ‘the only link between the defendant and the forum,’ its interpretation is incon-
sistent with Walden.”); see also Younique, L.L.C. v. Youssef, No. 2:15-cv-00783-JNP-DBP, 2016
WL 6998659, at *7 (D. Utah Nov. 30, 2016) (“Walden’s clarification may significantly narrow
otherwise broad readings of Calder’s ‘effects’ test.”).
49. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123–25 (“Unlike the broad publication of the forum-
focused story in Calder, the effects of [the defendant’s] conduct [in Georgia] on [the plaintiffs]
are not connected to [Nevada] in a way that makes those effects a proper basis for
jurisdiction.”).
50. For the relevant text of the footnote, see supra note 5.
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requirement. Walden, however, suggested that the Court might deviate from
the effects test and view internet cases differently.
C. Advanced Tactical: An Example of Walden Reining in Calder and
Restricting Internet Jurisdiction
The Seventh Circuit recently revisited the issue of establishing specific
jurisdiction via a defendant’s online activity in Advanced Tactical Ordnance
Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc.51 Advanced Tactical considered a
trademark-infringement action brought by Advanced Tactical (an Indiana
company) against Real Action Paintball (a California company) in an Indi-
ana federal court.52 Real Action posted an announcement on its website and
sent emails to customers declaring that it had acquired PepperBall53 prod-
ucts and implied that Real Action was now the only maker of those prod-
ucts, when, in fact, Advanced Tactical had bought the rights to PepperBall
products.54 Real Action also fulfilled several sales on allegedly infringing
products in Indiana.55 Moreover, Real Action repeatedly sent other emails to
Indiana customers,56 though it is not apparent whether those other emails
also contained infringing declarations. Thus, Advanced Tactical sought to
bring an out-of-state defendant into Indiana solely based on the defendant’s
online activity.
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.57 That the defendant knew Advanced Tactical “was
an Indiana company and could foresee that its misleading emails and sales
would harm Advanced Tactical in Indiana” was irrelevant to the jurisdic-
tional and due process analyses.58 Those contacts were created solely by the
plaintiff’s residence in the forum (and were thus jurisdictionally irrelevant
under Walden), not by the defendant.59 In short, a plaintiff’s connections
with the forum cannot be a decisive factor in the due process inquiry.60
51. 751 F.3d 796 (7th Cir. 2014).
52. Violations of the Lanham Act, unfair competition, trade dress infringement, and
misappropriation of trade secrets were also alleged. Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 799.
53. Pepperballs are a form of projectile, similar to but more dangerous than paintballs,
that contain powdered chemicals that irritate the eyes and nose and are often used by law
enforcement and corrections officers. See Eli Hager, Alternatives to Bullets, Marshall Project
(Sept. 23, 2015, 7:15 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/09/23/alternatives-to-bul
lets#.KrznwVO37 [https://perma.cc/9UYS-8BRA].
54. Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 798–99. Apparently, Real Action was contacted by a
Mexican company called APON to inquire into whether Real Action was interested in acquir-
ing irritant projectiles. Id. at 799. Before Advanced Tactical’s acquiring of PepperBall, APON
had supplied PepperBall with irritant projectiles. Id. at 798.
55. Id. at 801.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 798.
58. Id. at 801.
59. See id. at 802 (citing Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1118 (2014)).
60. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014) (quoting Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320, 332 (1980)).
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The court noted, however, that “[t]he question [of] whether harming a
plaintiff in the forum state creates sufficient minimum contacts is more
complex.”61 The court therefore had to confront how Calder might apply in
this context, post-Walden. Previously, in Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, the Seventh
Circuit had applied Calder broadly.62 The Advanced Tactical court abrogated
Janmark, stating that “after Walden there can be no doubt that ‘the plaintiff
cannot be the only link between the defendant and the forum.’ Any decision
that implies otherwise can no longer be considered authoritative.”63 Pursu-
ant to Walden, the court raised the minimum contacts threshold, thereby
restricting the exercise of specific jurisdiction.
But what of the defendant’s emails to Indiana residents and allegedly
infringing online sales? First, the court concluded that the jurisdictional
analysis does not change when a court considers a defendant’s online activ-
ity.64 The core question was still whether the defendant had somehow
targeted the forum.65 The court then addressed the emails: “The connection
between the place where an email is opened and a lawsuit is entirely fortui-
tous . . . . It may be different if there were evidence that a defendant in some
way targeted residents of a specific state, perhaps through geographically-
restricted online ads.”66 Furthermore, the defendant’s suit-related conduct of
simply posting allegedly infringing material on its website was not related to
the forum. Rather, like the emails, where one accesses the website is fortui-
tous67 (absent some sort of geographically targeted advertising68 or geo-
graphical access restrictions placed on the website by its operator).69 Thus,
the defendant’s online activity, by itself, did not establish jurisdictionally
relevant contacts.
61. Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 802.
62. 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[T]here can be no serious doubt after [Calder]
that the state in which the victim of a tort suffers the injury may entertain a suit against the
accused tortfeasor.”), abrogated by Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d 796.
63. Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 802 (citation omitted) (quoting Walden, 134 S. Ct. at
1122).
64. Id. at 802.
65. Id. at 802–03 (citing be2 LLC v. Ivanov, 642 F.3d 555, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2011)).
66. Id. at 803.
67. Id. Though applying Walden, this reasoning by the Seventh Circuit seems inspired by
the Nicastro plurality’s “purposeful direction” requirement. See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Ni-
castro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) (plurality opinion).
68. See, e.g., AdWords Help, Google, https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/1722
043?hl=EN-GB [https://perma.cc/T8UJ-XARV]; see also Rilley v. MoneyMutual, LLC, 884
N.W.2d 321, 335–37 (Minn. 2016) (holding that the defendant’s Google AdWords campaign
targeted at Minnesota residents was a relevant contact with the Minnesota forum for the pur-
pose of the minimum contacts analysis).
69. See Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of the Evasion of
Geolocation, 22 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 567, 584–85 (2012).
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Despite an indication that the Supreme Court might view an internet-
jurisdiction case differently,70 Walden nonetheless demands that the defen-
dant herself create contacts with the forum.71 But, as Part II will explain, the
Seventh Circuit’s contention that jurisdictional standards should apply with-
out modification to a defendant’s online activity should not go unnoticed.
Such an approach is misguided and results in an undue restriction on spe-
cific jurisdiction.
II. The Negative Implications of a Strict Application of Walden
to Online Activity
This Part explores the negative implications of strictly applying Walden
to internet tort suits: that approach tends to immunize defendants from
long-arm jurisdiction in cases where the plaintiff is the only direct link be-
tween the defendant and the forum. Section II.A argues that the concept of a
defendant specifically targeting a forum is misguided because, although no-
tions of territory are blurred on the internet, territory is not as completely
“fortuitous,” as the court in Advanced Tactical suggested. Section II.B argues
that the express-aiming requirement provides defendants too much immu-
nity from specific jurisdiction.
A. Notions of Territory Are Blurred, but Not Wholly Irrelevant,
on the Internet
The idea that one’s virtual conduct can establish any meaningful physi-
cal “contact” with a forum is, in part, a fiction.72 Take the act of sending an
email versus sending a physical letter as an example. If Ana drops a letter at
the post office in Ann Arbor to Ben in Boston, she initiates a (relatively
speaking) physically intensive process to transport that letter from Michigan
to Massachusetts. Ana has caused at least some intentional contact with
Massachusetts via the letter, and Ben has to be physically at his Boston home
to receive and read the letter.
But when Ana sends Ben an email, say, through Microsoft’s Outlook
email service, something entirely different occurs. First, through the use of a
smartphone or tablet, Ben can view the email anywhere. Second, “content”
and “noncontent” information is generated by Ana’s use of Outlook to send
the email, and Microsoft must store that information on a server, which is
located in a datacenter.73 Microsoft might store some of the information
70. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 n.9 (2014) (“[T]his case does not present
the very different questions whether and how a defendant’s virtual ‘presence’ and conduct
translate into ‘contacts’ with a particular State.” (emphasis added)).
71. See id. at 1125.
72. See Trammell & Bambauer, supra note 12, at 1167.
73. See Microsoft Corp. v. United States (In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Ac-
count Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp.), 829 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2016), cert.
granted, No. 17-2, 2017 WL 2869958 (U.S. Oct. 16, 2017). For a “virtual tour” of an example
of Microsoft’s datacenters, see Microsoft Global Datacenters, Microsoft, https://
www.microsoft.com/en-us/cloud-platform/global-datacenters [https://perma.cc/C5YK-K52L].
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(e.g., basic account information and email address-book information) in a
U.S. datacenter, and it might store the other content-based information
(e.g., the email’s text) in a foreign datacenter.74 Moreover, if Ben uses Gmail,
not Outlook, then Google also has the email on its own servers, which may
or may not be located in the same place as Microsoft’s servers.75
On the other hand, when Ana and Ben send emails to each other, they
establish virtual contact with each other’s forums. Their computers are
sending packets of information over a wired network from the source com-
puter’s address to the end computer’s address.76 Additionally, the computers
know that they are sending such information to a computer in a particular
place because their IP addresses are tied to geographic locations.77 This same
process applies when users visit websites or use apps on their phones—a
website’s server sends packets of information to the end user’s computer to
deliver the content.78 Thus, while notions of territory are blurred on the
internet, territory is not completely irrelevant79: the physical connection be-
tween two users’ territories is simply more “underground” (i.e., the wires),
while the connection that seems more meaningful (i.e., the content) is
virtual.80
In Advanced Tactical, the use of virtual tools accomplished a similar re-
sult (sales to Indiana) for the defendant while also providing a jurisdictional
shield. Currently, the law does not accommodate a more serious considera-
tion of the above-mentioned physical connections between internet users
See also Eugene Kim, Take a Tour of Google’s Secretive Data Centers Where All Your Photos and
Emails Are Stored, Bus. Insider (June 30, 2015, 9:55 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
google-data-centers-store-all-your-photos-and-emails-2015-6/#ogle-has-data-centers-in-14-
different-locations-including-the-netherlands-singapore-and-chile-this-is-the-one-in-finland-
1 [https://perma.cc/PG5Z-6M65] (images of Google’s datacenters).
74. See Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 202–03.
75. See Benjamin Mako Hill, I Don’t Use Gmail, but Google Still Has Lots of My Personal
Emails, Slate: Future Tense (May 13, 2014, 2:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future
_tense/2014/05/13/don_t_use_gmail_here_s_how_to_determine_how_many_of_your_emails
_google_may.html [https://perma.cc/UU3M-8DP7]; see also Data Center Locations, Google,
https://www.google.com/about/datacenters/inside/locations/index.html [https://perma.cc/
H24R-TAZR] (map of Google’s data center locations).
76. See, e.g., Gail Honda & Kipp Martin, The Essential Guide to Internet Busi-
ness Technology 71–76 (2002); see also Bellia et al., supra note 9, at 16–24 (providing a
simplified overview of the logistics of how information travels over the internet).
77. See IP Address Geographical Location Finder, IPFingerPrints, http://www.ipfinger
prints.com/ [https://perma.cc/8UB9-S7ZJ].
78. See supra notes 76–77.
79. To provide a concrete example, website operators can place geographic restrictions
on their websites and deny access to computers with IP addresses tied to particular locations.
See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 69, at 584–85; Zack Wallace, How to Block Entire Countries from
Accessing Your Website, SitePoint (Apr. 22, 2015), https://www.sitepoint.com/how-to-block-
entire-countries-from-accessing-website/ [https://perma.cc/65KD-XL3V].
80. Cf. TED, Andrew Blum: What Is the Internet, Really?, YouTube (Sept. 19, 2012),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XE_FPEFpHt4 [https://perma.cc/Q33C-R5SB] (discussing
the physical connections between routers and the cables that physically stretch across the
world to provide internet connection and facilitate these virtual transactions).
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and forums. The Advanced Tactical court seemed to suggest that, had the
defendant sent snail mail to the same Indiana customers who received the
emails, the company could have been brought to court in Indiana.81 Like-
wise, had the defendant opened a brick-and-mortar storefront in Indiana
where customers could have seen the allegedly infringing advertisements and
made purchases, then jurisdiction would have been proper.82 If virtual con-
duct does not create any jurisdictionally relevant connection to a forum, a
plaintiff would be severely limited in where she could bring a lawsuit.83 The
court’s concern about “fortuitousness”84 is really related to the defendant’s
lack of knowledge of a user’s location—that Indiana residents probably read
their emails in Indiana, as they would a letter, is not fortuitous. As Part III
notes, the defendant’s knowledge of the plaintiff’s particular location should
not be determinative in the jurisdictional analysis. But before courts adopt
that concept, they must first acknowledge that a physical network facilitates
users’ virtual conduct and that this network connects users to a forum.
B. The Express-Aiming Requirement Largely Immunizes Defendants from
Specific Jurisdiction in Internet Tort Suits
The express-aiming requirement for an intentional tort renders a defen-
dant largely immune to specific jurisdiction when the defendant engages in
conduct broadly via the internet. Express aiming requires (a) alleged wrong-
ful conduct aimed at a particular forum; (b) targeting, which suggests an
intentional selection of a particular plaintiff; and (c) knowledge of that
plaintiff’s location in the forum.85 This need for targeting produces a
counterintuitive result: the wider a defendant engages in allegedly wrongful
conduct, the less likely she is subject to specific jurisdiction in any of the
forums in which she causes harm.
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Alito, raised a similar concern in his
concurrence in Nicastro.86 The plurality in Nicastro suggested that the exer-
cise of specific jurisdiction is limited to instances in which a defendant con-
sents to the power of a foreign sovereign and purposefully targets a forum.87
Justice Breyer responded:
81. See Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d
796, 803 (7th Cir. 2014).
82. But even online sales stemming from the alleged infringement could have reached a
point where it can be said that Real Action could have reasonably been expected to be haled to
court in Indiana. See infra Part III.
83. See Trammell & Bambauer, supra note 12, at 1134–35.
84. See Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 803.
85. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
86. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 890 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring
in the judgment).
87. Id. at 880–82 (plurality opinion).
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But what do those standards mean when a company targets the world by
selling products from its Web site? And does it matter if, instead of ship-
ping the products directly, a company consigns the products through an
intermediary (say, Amazon.com) who then receives and fulfills the orders?
And what if the company markets its products through popup advertise-
ments that it knows will be viewed in a forum? Those issues have serious
commercial consequences but are totally absent in this case.88
Justice Breyer’s statement may be another hint that internet-jurisdiction
cases warrant unique considerations. Relatedly, the concurring justices ap-
peared to sense some unfairness in strict jurisdictional rules in light of mod-
ern technology.89 This sense of unfairness may be exacerbated by the fact
that defendants can perpetrate broad harm over the internet with less effort.
Gullen v. Facebook.com, Inc.90 which followed Advanced Tactical, con-
fronted this targeting issue. The plaintiff sued Facebook under an Illinois
statute, the Biometric Information Protection Act (BIPA), which prohibits
private entities from collecting biometric information from individuals ab-
sent their express consent.91 In Gullen, a third party uploaded to Facebook a
picture of the plaintiff, who was not a Facebook user.92 Facebook’s facial-
recognition technology allegedly scanned the plaintiff’s face from the picture
and thus extracted and stored his biometric information.93 Despite Facebook
developing a substantial user base in Illinois,94 despite Facebook allegedly
violating an Illinois statute through its conduct toward an Illinois plaintiff,
and despite Facebook engaging in this wrongdoing broadly, the district
court dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction.95
The district court rejected the contention that Facebook targeted Illinois
users because Facebook uses facial-recognition technology on every user-
uploaded photo, not just those photos uploaded by Illinois residents.96 The
district court determined there was no “targeting” of Illinois and that
Facebook was simply operating an interactive website available to Illinois
residents.97 The court further asserted that “plaintiff does not, and could not
plausibly, allege that Facebook knew an Illinois resident would upload a
photo of him and tag his name to it, thereby . . . giving Facebook access to
88. Id. at 890 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
89. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, dissented. Id. at 893–914
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting). These justices likely have an even more flexible stance on the exer-
cise of specific jurisdiction; but the concurring and dissenting justices in Nicastro joined the
unanimous Walden opinion. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1118 (2014).
90. No. 15 C 7681, 2016 WL 245910 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2016).
91. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15(a)–(b) (2016).
92. Gullen, 2016 WL 245910, at *1.
93. Id.
94. See Usage and Population Statistics, Internet World Stats, http://www.internet
worldstats.com/unitedstates.htm#IL [https://perma.cc/9NET-VKDG].
95. Gullen, 2016 WL 245910, at *3.
96. Id. at *2.
97. Id.
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plaintiff’s biometric information.”98 The Gullen court was therefore focused
on Facebook’s widespread use of facial-recognition technology and
Facebook’s lack of knowledge that the technology would harm this specific
plaintiff.
Though the Gullen court applied Walden, Advanced Tactical, and the
express-aiming requirement correctly according to precedent,99 its result
does not comport with notions of fair play and justice.100 This case exempli-
fies the negative implications of the express-aiming requirement for internet
cases. The fact that the pervasiveness of alleged wrongful conduct is in-
versely related to whether the forum state has jurisdiction over the defen-
dant—because such pervasive conduct is not “expressly aimed” at any
state—is counterintuitive and irrational. Facebook broke loose from a juris-
dictional mooring here because (1) it engaged in alleged wrongful conduct
broadly,101 and (2) it did not intentionally select the individual plaintiff as its
target or know that the plaintiff was in the forum. A defendant’s lack of
knowledge of a plaintiff’s location is a recurrent jurisdictional problem in
internet tort suits.102 Facebook knew it had users in Illinois, and it knew
about BIPA—and yet it avoided liability (at least for now)103 on jurisdic-
tional grounds. Part III argues for a solution that avoids this type of overly
plaintiff-restrictive result.
III. Finding Minimum Virtual Contacts While Counseling
Against Unreasonable Exercises of Specific Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court should broaden its narrow jurisdictional rules when
assessing whether exercising specific jurisdiction in an internet tort suit
comports with traditional notions of fair play and justice. A new “minimum
virtual contacts” analysis should consider whether a defendant engaged in
substantial or continuous tortious conduct—not whether a defendant, in a
strict sense, “expressly aimed” such conduct at a forum. Section III.A out-
lines two scenarios to illustrate these factors. Section III.B argues that, if
98. Id. at *3 (emphases added).
99. But see Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 2015)
(reaching the opposite result as Gullen and noting that “[t]he statute [the defendant is] ac-
cused of violating is an Illinois statute” and the claim “stems out of [the defendant’s] contact
with Illinois residents”).
100. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
101. This widespread conduct flows from the nature of Facebook as a website—its reach is
international. See, e.g., Facebook, Facebook Q2 2017 Results 2 (2017), https://s21.q4cdn.
com/399680738/files/doc_presentations/FB-Q2’17-Earnings-Presentation.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9EH4-HHJE] (showing that, in the second quarter of 2017, 86.2% of Facebook’s
daily active users were outside of the United States and Canada).
102. See Grantz, supra note 12, at 1151–56 (discussing courts’ treatment of the issue of
when a plaintiff’s location may be unclear to a defendant); see also Andrews & Newman, supra
note 12, at 365–66.
103. In a separate case, a federal district court in California recently denied Facebook’s
motion to dismiss and allowed the Illinois plaintiffs’ BIPA claim to proceed. See In re Facebook
Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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minimum virtual contacts are established, courts should look to factors
from Supreme Court precedent that militate against unreasonable exercises
of jurisdiction. These “reasonableness factors” include the defendant’s bur-
den of litigating the suit in the plaintiff’s forum state compared to the plain-
tiff’s burden of litigating elsewhere, whether litigating outside the plaintiff’s
jurisdiction would inhibit a convenient and an efficient resolution of the
suit, and the forum state’s interest in furthering a fundamental substantive
policy.104
In short, courts should find minimum virtual contacts when (a) the
defendant engages in substantial or continuous allegedly wrongful conduct
online, (b) that causes harm connected to the forum, and (c) the plaintiff
experiences the brunt of that harm in the forum. Furthermore, if a defen-
dant lacks knowledge of the plaintiff’s location in the forum, that fact should
not be dispositive in the minimum virtual contacts inquiry.
A. A Minimum Virtual Contacts Analysis Should Consider a Defendant’s
Technological Sophistication and the Frequency of the Tortious
Conduct
Traditional jurisdictional analysis often requires a consideration of how
much effort a defendant expends to contact a forum. The more effort a
defendant expends—for example, by advertising or opening an office, estab-
lishing long-term relationships, or harassing a plaintiff in the forum—the
more likely that defendant will be subject to specific jurisdiction.105 When a
defendant is unaware of the plaintiff’s location, courts should consider how
much technological sophistication the wrongful conduct required. When the
defendant knows the plaintiff’s location, courts should also consider the fre-
quency of the tortious activity. Courts can infer an intent to perpetrate
harm from these factors and thus determine whether a defendant has suffi-
cient virtual contacts with the forum.
1. When a Defendant Is Unaware of Plaintiff’s Location
The issue of defendants often not knowing where their potential victims
are located106 necessarily cuts against a defendant’s ability to “reasonably
104. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985).
105. See, e.g., J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 886 (2011) (plurality
opinion); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480 (defendant “entered into a carefully structured 20-year
relationship that envisioned continuing and wide-reaching contacts with Burger King in [the
forum]” (emphasis added)); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colom., S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
411–12 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295 (1980);
Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 706 (7th Cir. 2010) (defendants engaged in an orchestrated
campaign of online harassment against a particular forum plaintiff and his business).
106. See Grantz, supra note 12, at 1151–56.
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anticipate being haled into court” in the forum state.107 Nonetheless, a de-
fendant can still cause substantial harm to plaintiffs without knowing where
they are located. For example, in Pavlovich v. Superior Court, DVD Copy
Control Association, a California nonprofit, sued Matthew Pavlovich, a
Texas resident and technology consultant, for posting code on his website
that enabled users to decrypt copyright protections and pirate DVDs.108 Pav-
lovich was a technologically sophisticated defendant,109 he was seemingly
aware of the illegality of his conduct,110 and he apparently knew the indus-
tries he sought to harm had a substantial presence in California.111 But the
California Supreme Court held, in a 4–3 vote, that the state could not exer-
cise jurisdiction over Pavlovich,112 despite the fact that Pavlovich should have
reasonably anticipated being brought to court there.113
Pavlovich’s website was also not expressly aimed at California114—pre-
sumably he wanted copyright pirates anywhere to download and utilize the
decryption code. Even if the plaintiff had presented evidence that only
Californians had downloaded the code,115 that would be irrelevant to the
jurisdictional inquiry under Walden and Advanced Tactical.116 Such an ap-
proach is misguided because such downloads connect the harm to the
forum.117
107. See World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297. This phrase from World-Wide Volk-
swagen is simply a framework for thinking about when a defendant might be subject to long-
arm jurisdiction.
108. 58 P.3d 2, 5 (Cal. 2002).
109. Pavlovich worked as a technology consultant and studied computer engineering at
Purdue. Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 5.
110. Critically, Pavlovich allegedly left the decryption code on his website even after re-
ceiving a cease-and-desist letter from the plaintiff. Id. at 15 (Baxter, J., dissenting).
111. Id. at 14.
112. Id. at 13 (majority opinion).
113. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980).
114. See Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 10.
115. In fact, the plaintiff presented no evidence that any Californians actually downloaded
the code. Id.
116. See Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1123 (2014) (“Due process requires that a
defendant be haled into court in a forum State based on his own affiliation with the State, not
based on the ‘random, fortuitous, or attenuated’ contacts he makes by interacting with other
persons affiliated with the State.” (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475
(1985))); see also Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d
796, 802 (7th Cir.2014) (“The relation between the defendant and the forum ‘must arise out of
contacts that the “defendant himself” creates with the forum State.’ ” (quoting Walden, 134 S.
Ct. at 1126)). These cases would see the above hypothetical as a situation where the defen-
dant’s contacts with California are created by third-party downloads of the code, rather than
by the “defendant himself.”
117. See supra Section II.A; see also Pokémon Co. Int’l v. Frasier, No. C14-112Z, 2014 WL
12104551, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2014) (“In light of . . . the substantial number of
Washington users of defendant’s allegedly infringing products, and the revenues generated by
these users, it is clear that defendant is subject to specific personal jurisdiction in [Washing-
ton].”). The Pokémon court also noted that numerous Washington residents downloaded the
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Instead, courts should look at a Pavlovich-type scenario through a dif-
ferent lens. First, if a California user downloaded the code and pirated con-
tent, then the defendant’s posting the code would have had an effect
(decrypting copyrighted material) in California. Second, when a California
user visits the website and downloads the code, the website’s servers sends
packets of information over a network to the California computer’s IP ad-
dress in order to execute the transaction.118 Additionally, to engineer code
that decrypts copyright protections requires technical sophistication. Con-
trary to the Pavlovich court’s view,119 the upshot is that virtual contacts like
this are established by more effort than a simple click of a download button.
Technological sophistication is an important factor in the virtual con-
tacts analysis because sophisticated defendants are more aware of the poten-
tial effects of their conduct and should reasonably anticipate being brought
to court in the forum in which they cause harm. Both a defendant’s experi-
ence with particular technology and the complexity of a defendant’s conduct
can indicate sophistication. Courts have applied a similar principle in cases
about eBay transactions, and courts have found jurisdiction was established
when a defendant was a more sophisticated seller (i.e., a more regular eBay
user).120 Thus, this sophistication factor should also apply when defendants
know the location of plaintiffs. This approach makes sense because more
technologically sophisticated conduct can generally cause more substantial
harm.121 The greater the harm, the stronger the tie is to a given forum. In
such cases, it may not be unreasonable for defendants to take their plaintiffs
in the forum where they find them.122
app in question and defendant’s website was visited thousands of times by Washington re-
sidents. Id. at *2.
118. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text.
119. See Pavlovich, 58 P.3d at 10 (stating that the website “merely posts information” (em-
phasis added)).
120. See, e.g., Dedvukaj v. Maloney, 447 F. Supp. 2d 813, 822–23 (E.D. Mich. 2006) (not-
ing that the argument that the defendant does not operate eBay itself, and therefore should not
be subject to jurisdiction, is less plausible “when applied to a seller of the Defendants’ sophisti-
cation”); Malcolm v. Esposito, 63 Va. Cir. 440, 446 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2003); cf. Boschetto v.
Hansing, 539 F.3d 1011, 1018–19 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing the aforementioned cases with ap-
proval); Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 506 (La. Ct. App. 2007) (Welch, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with the exercise of jurisdiction in part because of a lack of evidence to support
the contention that defendants were sophisticated eBay sellers).
121. See, e.g., ‘Internet of Things’ Hacking Attack Led to Widespread Outrage of Popular
Websites, NPR (Oct. 22, 2016, 8:10 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/10/22/498954197/internet-
outage-update-internet-of-things-hacking-attack-led-to-outage-of-popula (on file with the
Michigan Law Review); #97 What Kind of Idiot Gets Phished?, Gimlet: Reply All (May 18,
2017), https://gimletmedia.com/episode/97-what-kind-of-idiot-gets-phished/ [https://
perma.cc/4XVL-6DMK] (generally discussing how hackers go about phishing schemes and
how phishing allows hackers to steal users’ personal information).
122. See Andrews & Newman, supra note 12, at 365–68.
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2. When a Defendant Knows Plaintiff’s Location
Even in cases where the defendant knows where a plaintiff is located,
that knowledge does not automatically establish minimum contacts to jus-
tify exercising specific jurisdiction. When the defendant knows where the
plaintiff is located, the jurisdictional analysis should also consider the fre-
quency with which a defendant engaged in tortious conduct over the in-
ternet to establish minimum contacts. More frequent conduct supports an
inference of intent to perpetrate harm in a particular location.123
For example, this inference could have been drawn in Griffis v. Luban,
where a Minnesota defendant, over several months, posted allegedly defama-
tory statements about an Alabama plaintiff on an internet newsgroup fo-
rum.124 While an Alabama court entered a default judgment against the
defendant,125 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that Alabama could not
exercise specific jurisdiction over the defendant because she had not ex-
pressly aimed her conduct at Alabama.126 The defendant, despite knowing
the plaintiff resided in and suffered harm in the forum state, evaded juris-
diction because she broadly disseminated her statements on the internet and
thereby failed to satisfy the express-aiming requirement. But because of the
frequency with which the defendant engaged in this conduct, which she
knew would have its impact in Alabama, the court could have allowed Ala-
bama to exercise jurisdiction consistent with notions of fair play and
justice.127
123. This inference could also be made even if the plaintiff’s location is unknown to the
tortfeasor. See Facebook, Inc. v. ConnectU LLC, No. C 07-01389 RS, 2007 WL 2326090, at
*5–6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 13, 2007); Verizon Online Servs., Inc. v. Ralsky, 203 F. Supp. 2d 601, 620
(E.D. Va. 2002) (“Defendants allegedly purposefully transmitted millions of [unsolicited bulk
email] to Verizon’s e-mail servers. They cannot seek to escape answering for these actions by
simply pleading ignorance as to where these severs were physically located.”); see infra note
127. But this Section will not focus on this scenario.
124. 646 N.W.2d 527, 529–30 (Minn. 2002). The defendant also knew the plaintiff lived
and worked in Alabama. Griffis, 646 N.W.2d at 535.
125. Id. at 529.
126. Id. at 536.
127. See, e.g., Internet Sols. Corp. v. Marshall, 39 So.3d 1201, 1203–04, 1214–16 (Fla.
2010) (finding that specific jurisdiction was established where defendant posted repeated de-
famatory statements online and plaintiff provided evidence that the website was accessed and
read by Florida residents); Kauffman Racing Equip., LLC v. Roberts, 930 N.E.2d 784, 788–89,
796 (Ohio 2010) (finding that the defendant posted repeated defamatory statements online,
which were read by Ohio residents, and concluding that defendant intended an Ohio resident
to be the victim); cf. Facebook, 2007 WL 2326090. In Facebook, the district court found that the
defendant, ConnectU, though under the belief that the plaintiff, Facebook, was located in
Massachusetts, nonetheless specifically targeted their conduct at the plaintiff, see Facebook,
2007 WL 2326090, at *6, and the court stated:
Reconciling “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” that underlie all ju-
risdictional analysis with the established tests for personal jurisdiction . . . the Court finds
that a defendant need not have knowledge as to which geographic forum the plaintiff
resides in, so long as the conduct was aimed at and likely to cause harm in that forum.
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It is not clear that the Advanced Tactical court would consider this fac-
tor. Even if the defendant had ignored Advanced Tactical’s cease-and-desist
letter after the first round of emails and online posts, the court would have
probably emphasized that the location at which such statements are seen was
fortuitous.128 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit would have likely disregarded
this factor and found no minimum contacts because the defendant’s suit-
related contact would still have arisen out of the plaintiff’s residence in the
forum. Furthermore, the defendant’s conduct would still have been targeted
broadly, via email blasts and online posts, rather than expressly aimed at
Indiana.
But if the defendant knew it was profiting from Indiana customers via
its online trademark infringement and had been put on notice by a particu-
lar plaintiff, then the defendant should have reasonably anticipated being
brought to court in the forum. Emails and online posts establish some vir-
tual contact with the forum,129 so frequent emails and online posts increase
virtual contact with the forum. These contacts should eventually cross the
minimum contacts threshold such that the exercise of specific jurisdiction
comports with notions of fair play and justice.130
Some scholars, like Judge Frank Easterbrook, may object to this consid-
eration of different factors as a specialized endeavor that deviates from the
general rules of jurisdiction.131 These scholars would probably see this stan-
dard as unhelpful and confusing. While the minimum virtual contacts ap-
proach seeks to apply the general minimum contacts standard, it concededly
applies the general standard in a slightly different way. But the premise that
cyberspace is a specialized, or niche, endeavor is increasingly untenable: the
internet is only growing in ubiquity and importance. The number and im-
portance of cases involving online activity will naturally increase, and this
solution recognizes that reality.
In sum, if a defendant engages in technologically sophisticated or con-
tinuous wrongdoing, such conduct supports the inference that the defen-
dant intended harm in a forum. If other forum residents are involved (e.g.,
Id. at *1. This case presents a scenario where the defendant knew the plaintiff but was mis-
taken as to the plaintiff’s location. Once again, in these situations, defendants should reasona-
bly expect to take their plaintiffs in the forum where they find them. See Andrews & Newman,
supra note 12, at 365–68.
128. Advanced Tactical sent Real Action a cease-and-desist letter after Real Action’s al-
leged trademark infringement, which stemmed from the content of their emails and online
posts. See Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys. LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796,
799, 803 (7th Cir. 2014).
129. See supra notes 76–78 and accompanying text; see also supra note 117 and accompa-
nying text.
130. See Int’l Shoe Co., v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1946); see also Pokémon Co.
Int’l v. Frasier, No. C14–112Z, 2014 WL 12104551, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 2014).
131. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. Chi. Legal
F. 207. Easterbrook notes that “the best way to learn the law applicable to specialized endeav-
ors is to study general rules.” Id. at 207. For example, Judge Easterbrook would equate a class
about the law of the internet with a class about “The Law of the Horse.” See id. at 207–08.
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by purchasing infringing products or reading defamatory statements on-
line), then the harm is further connected to the forum. Finally, plaintiffs
who reside in the forum likely experience the brunt of the harm in the fo-
rum, even if they could theoretically also access the internet in other loca-
tions. If these factors are satisfied, then courts should find the defendant
established sufficient minimum virtual contacts with the forum.
B. Courts Should Simplify the Existing Reasonableness Test and
Apply It Seriously
Due process mandates that the exercise of jurisdiction over a defendant
be reasonable and fair. Therefore, even where virtual contacts are estab-
lished, courts look to other factors, which may counsel against the exercise
of jurisdiction if it would be unreasonable and unfair. This Section outlines
and applies these factors to Advanced Tactical and Gullen.
Burger King’s five “reasonableness factors” guide courts’ determination
of whether exercising specific jurisdiction would be reasonable.132 Rather
than going through each of the five factors, courts should simplify the rea-
sonableness test to the following questions: (a) whether the defendant car-
ries a greater burden if the suit is litigated in the plaintiff’s forum compared
to the plaintiff’s burden of litigating the suit elsewhere, (b) whether litigating
in a forum outside the plaintiff’s jurisdiction would inhibit a convenient and
an efficient resolution of the suit, and (c) whether the plaintiff’s forum state
has an interest in furthering a fundamental substantive policy. An affirma-
tive answer to the first question and a negative answer to the second and
third would tip the scales in favor of the defendant. Because the plaintiff
carries the burden of establishing personal jurisdiction, the reasonableness
test should have some bite and thus counteract unreasonable and unfair ex-
ercises of specific jurisdiction in close cases.
Courts should give far more weight to these factors than the Supreme
Court has. Asahi, in which all the justices agreed that subjecting the defen-
dant to jurisdiction in California would be unreasonable,133 was the last time
the whole Court seriously considered reasonableness. Of late, only Justice
Sotomayor has applied the reasonableness factors—and she has shown how
reasonableness does not counsel in favor of only one side.134 In the Court’s
latest specific jurisdiction case, Bristol-Myers Squibb, the majority did not so
132. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 477 (1985) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1979)).
133. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
134. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1786–87 (2017)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (finding that jurisdiction would be reasonable); Daimler AG v.
Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 764 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[N]o mat-
ter how extensive [the defendant’s] contacts with California, that State’s exercise of jurisdiction
would be unreasonable given that the case involves foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant
based on foreign conduct, and given that a more appropriate forum is available.”).
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much as mention reasonableness.135 This should change because reasonable-
ness can help ensure fairness when courts assess specific jurisdiction in the
digital age.
1. Advanced Tactical Reconsidered
When Indiana customers viewed Real Action’s emails and visited the
Real Action website, and then Real Action affirmatively fulfilled their orders,
Real Action established virtual contacts with the forum on its own. For pur-
poses of this discussion, assume that those contacts were sufficient to estab-
lish “minimum” contacts.
Even with such virtual contacts, Real Action does not necessarily come
within the long arm of Indiana’s jurisdiction because the reasonableness fac-
tors, taken together, weigh against the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction. Be-
cause the defendant’s burden of litigating in Indiana is at least equal to, if
not greater than, the plaintiff’s burden of litigating elsewhere, it would not
necessarily be inefficient to litigate in California instead of Indiana, and the
plaintiff’s home state had no substantive policy at stake. Advanced Tactical
primarily sought to litigate federal trademark claims,136 and it should not
matter which federal court hears those claims;137 Advanced Tactical also in-
cluded some state trademark claims, but it is unclear whether any substan-
tive state social policy was at issue. Furthermore, while Advanced Tactical
was a private Indiana company, it also had an office in California (Real Ac-
tion’s home forum).138
2. Gullen Reconsidered
On the other hand, Gullen would have been decided differently under
this approach. When the person who uploaded the picture of the plaintiff
visited Facebook’s website, Facebook established virtual contacts with the
forum. Facebook, which operates servers throughout the country,139 sent
packets of information through the packet-switch network to the third
party’s computer, which was located in Illinois. Facebook, by nature of its
135. Bristol-Myers Squibb, 137 S. Ct. at 1773–84.
136. See Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d
796, 798, 800 (7th Cir. 2014).
137. See Robert E. Pfeffer, A 21st Century Approach to Personal Jurisdiction, 13 U.N.H. L.
Rev. 65, 126–27 (2015). That is, litigating the federal claim in a different federal court presents
no loss of judicial efficiency, whereas litigating an Indiana state law claim in a California
federal court may result in a certain amount of inefficiency due to the federal court’s relative
lack of experience with the foreign jurisdiction’s state law.
138. See Advanced Tactical, 751 F.3d at 798–99.
139. See The Facebook Data Center FAQ, Data Ctr. Knowledge, http://www.datacenter
knowledge.com/the-facebook-data-center-faq/ [https://perma.cc/UE2T-KTUR]. Facebook also
apparently has servers in California, but those servers reached capacity years ago, which re-
sulted in the need for an expansion in infrastructure. See Becca Logan, Keeping Up, Facebook
(Dec. 21, 2007, 1:01 PM), https://www.facebook.com/notes/facebook/keeping-up/7899307130/
[https://perma.cc/5WPD-SY6V].
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Illinois user base,140 thus has substantial virtual contact with the forum. If
Facebook had failed to follow the disclosure process outlined in BIPA,141 its
conduct (utilizing facial-recognition technology) would have been related to
the suit. Additionally, developing the algorithm and code behind the facial-
recognition technology required significant effort142 and sophistication on
the part of Facebook and its employees.143 The frequency with which
Facebook deploys its facial-recognition technology and the technological so-
phistication of the conduct tip the scales in favor of finding minimum vir-
tual contacts with Illinois. Therefore, the defendant (a) engaged in
substantial and continuous allegedly wrongful conduct by deploying its fa-
cial-recognition technology and storing biometric information without
users’ consent; (b) that conduct caused harm connected to the forum when
Illinois users uploaded photos to Facebook; and (c) the plaintiff experienced
the brunt of the harm in Illinois because he was a resident of the state,
which passed a law prohibiting Facebook’s alleged conduct.
The analysis should also consider the aforementioned factors to deter-
mine whether exercising such jurisdiction would be reasonable. First, the
large corporate defendant, Facebook, which has offices in Illinois,144 carries a
substantially lighter burden if it were required to litigate in Illinois compared
to the plaintiff if he were required to litigate in California. Second, requiring
California’s federal district courts to interpret an Illinois state law and adju-
dicate claims arising out of that law smacks of judicial inefficiency. Third,
BIPA represents a social policy adopted by Illinois in favor of public security
and privacy in light of the growing use of biometric information.145 Taken
together, these factors weigh heavily in favor of requiring Facebook to liti-
gate this case in Illinois.146
140. See Usage and Population Statistics, supra note 94.
141. 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15 (2016).
142. See, e.g., Mathew Ingram, Facebook’s New Algorithm Can Recognize You Even if Your
Face Is Hidden, Fortune (June 23, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/23/facebook-facial-rec
ognition/ [https://perma.cc/K942-YBKR] (“The research [to develop the face memory technol-
ogy] took 40,000 public photos from the social network . . . .”).
143. For an example of a Facebook software engineer’s desired qualifications, see Software
Eng’g, Applied Research Scientist, Core Machine Learning, Facebook, https://www.face
book.com/careers/jobs/a0I1200000LSIn5EAH/?ref=a8l12000000KymFAAS [https://perma.cc/
SU9H-8JFH].
144. See Gullen v. Facebook.com, Inc., No. 15 C 7681, 2016 WL 245910, at *2 (N.D. Ill.
Jan. 21, 2016).
145. See 740 Ill. Comp. Stat. 14/15.
146. The year prior to Gullen, the same federal district court in Illinois held that Shut-
terfly was subject to jurisdiction for a BIPA violation based, in part, on its analysis of these
factors. See Norberg v. Shutterfly, Inc., 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1105 (N.D. Ill. 2015). The court,
however, made rather quick work of its jurisdictional inquiry and seemingly rested its analysis
of Shutterfly’s contacts with Illinois on the fact that Shutterfly ships products into the state.
See id. Under a strict application of Walden, this analysis seems incorrect. The shipping of
products into the forum is not related to the suit. Rather Shutterfly’s scanning and storing
Illinois residents’ biometric information without their consent constitutes the suit-related con-
duct, which the court only references when it addresses the 12(b)(6) motion. See id. at
1105–06.
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Even with this second reasonableness prong, however, one could argue
that the minimum virtual contacts approach is too permissive and has the
potential to infringe on defendants’ due process rights. But under this ap-
proach it would not be fair to subject a defendant to specific jurisdiction if
she were technologically unsophisticated and engaged in infrequent allegedly
tortious conduct via the internet. Instead, under this virtual contacts stan-
dard, the more effort a defendant expends in perpetrating harm, the more
likely that defendant will be subject to specific jurisdiction. The absence of
technological sophistication and frequent tortious conduct counsel against
finding sufficient contacts at prong one. As shown above, prong two also
counsels against unreasonable exercises of jurisdiction.147
Because the minimum virtual contacts standard requires courts to assess
technological sophistication, the frequency of the tortious conduct, and the
reasonableness of exercising jurisdiction, some scholars may argue that the
standard suffers from the same deficiency as traditional minimum contacts:
it is too unpredictable and fact specific.148 But it may be difficult to discern
ex ante what exactly satisfies due process and fairness amid an ever-evolving
commercial and technological landscape.149 Fairness does not necessarily re-
quire total predictability.150 Furthermore, this virtual contacts standard is
not wholly unpredictable: technologically unsophisticated and infrequent
tortious conduct—for example, a few allegedly defamatory tweets—would
not establish sufficient contact with a forum state. This standard is more
flexible and therefore better suited to adapt to the changing technological
landscape, analyze close cases, and achieve equitable results.
Conclusion
In sum, the current minimum contacts approach to online activity, ex-
emplified by Advanced Tactical’s and Gullen’s application of Walden, fails to
account for the unique considerations presented by online activity. As com-
merce and technology developed between Pennoyer and International Shoe,
courts adapted to that change and adopted the minimum contacts approach.
Courts today should likewise modify their analysis when they assess mini-
mum virtual contacts by considering a defendant’s sophistication and the
frequency with which a defendant engages in tortious conduct. Due process
147. Cf. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987) (holding unani-
mously that California’s exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant was unreasonable).
148. See, e.g., Simona Grossi, Personal Jurisdiction: A Doctrinal Labyrinth with No Exit, 47
Akron L. Rev. 617 (2014); Pfeffer, supra note 137, at 133–34; Sachs, supra note 12, at 1302.
149. See Bellia et al., supra note 9, at 130–31.
150. For example, it might be unpredictable for out-of-state plaintiffs to bring an out-of-
state defendant into a state in which neither those plaintiffs nor the defendant reside. But
Justice Sotomayor asserted, perhaps rightly, that this would be fair at least in some cases. See
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1784 (2017) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“A core concern in this Court’s personal jurisdiction cases is fairness. And there is
nothing unfair about subjecting a massive corporation to suit in a State for a nationwide
course of conduct that injures both forum residents and nonresidents alike.”).
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does not mandate simply extending, wholesale and without modification,
yesterday’s legal rules to today’s environment.
Future scholarship should further explore internet infrastructure and
how that virtual infrastructure translates into contacts with physical places.
Additionally, what level of contacts is sufficient to constitute “minimum”
contacts needs to be refined, particularly for cases involving commercial ac-
tivity like Advanced Tactical. Ultimately, fairness is at the core of due process
and personal jurisdiction cases. But the strict application of recent precedent
to internet tort suits reaches fundamentally unfair and intolerable results.
The minimum virtual contacts standard seeks to better adhere to notions of
fair play and justice.
